Security and Identity

This page documents the audited authentication, authorization, tenancy, and security-control surfaces across AlphaSwarm.

Identity architecture

Surface	Identity model	Notes
`alphaswarm_ui`	Microsoft Entra ID only for hosted customer app; BFF authenticates and proxies to API/control plane.	UI README states Auth0 has been removed and guarded by CI checks.
`alphaswarm_admin`	Staff/admin auth integrated with tenant onboarding/admin flows.	Uses Python backend and TypeScript frontends.
`alphaswarm_auth`	Provider-agnostic auth service with Entra/GitHub/WebAuthn adapter model, unified RBAC, device hub, software CA.	Owns local platform metadata and short-lived device certificates.
`alphaswarm_platform` tenant router	OIDC/JWT verification, tenant/workspace/cell routing, Cell-Bound Authorization validation.	Rejects invalid token state fail-closed in required/permissive modes.
`alphaswarm_worker`	OAuth 2.0 device flow plus device registration; optional `--require-auth`.	Designed for standalone worker node operation.
`alphaswarm_cli`	CLI login/setup/control flows; issue audit references YubiKey and connection-error fixes.	Should be aligned with worker/device auth posture.
`alphaswarm_mcp` and IDE	MCP/IDE connectivity should rely on platform auth and per-tenant authorization.	Open P0 hardening/go-live issues remain.

Tenant router resolves tenant_id, workspace_id, organization, user, and tier claims into a deployment cell.
Upstream services receive verified headers such as cell, tenant, workspace, subject, and organization headers after the edge overwrites any client-supplied values.
RLS is a critical data-plane backstop for tenant/workspace tables.
Open issues indicate strict-mode RLS rollout is not fully proven and some tenant-scoped tables still lack complete policies.

alphaswarm_ops_console uses predeclared argv lists and constrained parameters instead of shell-string execution.
Hosted UI is Entra-only and explicitly separates marketing site, local client, staff admin, and authenticated app responsibilities.
Tenant router accepts asymmetric JWT algorithms only and fails fast on unusable auth config.
Device/WebAuthn/CA design supports short-lived mTLS client certificates and hardware-key step-up.
alphaswarm_orchestration rejects inline secret-bearing keys in portable contracts and keeps secrets as references.
Observability SDK split (alphaswarm_observe, alphaswarm_observe_js) supports privacy-first telemetry boundaries.

Priority	Gap	Evidence
P0	Some tenant-scoped tables carry `workspace_id` but lack RLS policies.	`alphaswarm#138`
P0	Context-less writers fail closed under tenancy RLS enforcement.	`alphaswarm#137`
P0	RLS strict-mode rollout and null-workspace backfill need validation before go-live.	`alphaswarm#32`
P0	Agent-ledger RLS DDL must be applied to every target DB before enforcement.	`alphaswarm#139`
P1	Bootstrap path does not seed default tenancy rows for fresh create/stamp DB.	`alphaswarm#145`
P1	Read-only health collectors under-report under RLS enforcement.	`alphaswarm#146`
P1	Episode lesson storage needs PII redaction beyond length cap.	`alphaswarm_agents#20`

Security documentation in alphaswarm_docs should include: